

Fictional sample. The company, systems and data are invented;
no real client was assessed.

Security assessment report

SaaS architecture, applications and APIs, cloud and CI/CD, and AI agents

Prepared for	Fernleaf Billing Ltd
Prepared by	Unmesha Technologies
Reference	UM-SA-001, revision 3.0
Issued	1 October 2026
Distribution	Public sample

Contents

Report control

Reference	UM-SA-001, revision 3.0, issued 1 October 2026
Prepared for	Fernleaf Billing Ltd
Audience	Founders, engineering leads and release approvers
Testing	14 to 18 September 2026, in Fernleaf's test environment
Status	All 10 findings open. Issued before any fixes.

Executive summary	03
Findings register	04
What we reviewed	05
Where each finding sits	06
How we tested and rated each finding	07
Findings	08
SaaS architecture: ARC-01 and ARC-02	09
Application and API: APP-01 to APP-03	11
Cloud and CI/CD: CLD-01 to CLD-03	15
AI and agent security: AI-01 and AI-02	18
Remediation plan	21
Closure checklist	22
Limits and references	23

How to read this report

Start with the executive summary. The register lists every finding with its risk and a proposed owner. Each finding page then opens with a plain summary and closes with what fixed looks like. Owners are proposed roles for your team to confirm.

One customer can read another customer’s invoices

In this fictional product, a signed-in customer could read another customer’s invoices by changing a number in an invoice link. The data export and the AI search had the same gap. Separately, code and permissions could reach production without the approval the team believed was in place.

10

Findings

7

High

3

Medium

Issued before any fixes. Retesting is scoped separately.

Do first

- 01

Make every invoice, export and search request check which customer is asking (ARC-01, APP-01, AI-01).
- 02

Allow only approved releases and roles into production (CLD-01 to CLD-03).
- 03

Switch off the assistant’s send action until a person approves each send (AI-02).

For your engineers

Area	High	Medium	Main change
SaaS architecture	1	1	Tie each export job to the account that asked for it, and keep webhooks to public addresses.
Application and API	2	1	Check the account, the user’s role and current membership on every request.
Cloud and CI/CD	2	1	Limit production access to the protected workflow, approved roles and approved images.
AI and agents	2	0	Filter search by account, and require a verified approval before any external action.

Ten findings and their proposed owners

Ordered by area. Risk is likelihood multiplied by impact, each scored from 1 to 5 (page 7).

ID	Finding	Risk	Proposed owner	Page
ARC-01	Export workers trust the account named in the request A customer can download another customer's invoices through the export feature.	High 4 × 4 = 16	Platform engineering	09
ARC-02	Webhook destinations can reach the internal network A customer can set a webhook that calls services inside Fernleaf's own network.	Medium 3 × 3 = 9	Platform and network engineering	10
APP-01	Invoice reads skip the account ownership check Changing one number in an invoice link shows another customer's invoice.	High 4 × 4 = 16	Application engineering	11
APP-02	Members can send invitations that grant Billing admin A user with read-only access can give someone full control of the customer account.	High 4 × 4 = 16	Application and identity engineering	13
APP-03	Removed users keep access until their session expires A person removed from a customer account can still see its data while they stay signed in.	Medium 3 × 3 = 9	Identity and application engineering	14
CLD-01	Production role trusts every branch in the repository A test branch can get the same production access as an approved release.	High 3 × 4 = 12	Cloud platform and release engineering	15
CLD-02	Deployment permissions can pass an unintended admin role The release pipeline can run code under an admin role it was never meant to use.	High 3 × 5 = 15	Cloud security and platform engineering	16
CLD-03	Release approval is not bound to the deployed image The release you approve isn't guaranteed to be the one that goes live.	Medium 3 × 3 = 9	Release engineering	17
AI-01	Assistant search returns other customers' documents The AI search can show one customer's documents to another customer.	High 4 × 4 = 16	AI platform and application engineering	18
AI-02	The assistant can send email without the required approval The AI assistant can email a report outside the company without anyone approving it.	High 3 × 4 = 12	Agent platform and product engineering	19

All findings are open. Start with the High findings that expose another customer's data, then adjust the order for how reachable each path is and what depends on it.

What we reviewed

The product

Fernleaf Billing runs an online billing service. Business customers sign in to see and pay their invoices, download exports, send invoice events to their own systems by webhook and ask an AI assistant about their billing.

Rules we tested against

Area	What the product is meant to do
Billing application	Each customer account is kept apart from every other. Members can view and download. Billing admins can also pay, change payment details and invite users.
Exports	A background worker builds each export, and it must contain only the requesting customer's invoices.
Webhooks	Customers can register endpoints on the public internet. Fernleaf's internal services are not valid destinations.
Assistant	Search results stay within the user's account. Sending anything outside the company needs a person's approval for that recipient and report.
Cloud deployment	Only the protected production workflow can obtain production deployment access.
Release images	Approval covers the exact image that is later deployed.

Test accounts and data

Item	Details
Alder Studio	Customer account with a Member (Priya Shah) and a Billing admin (Tom Hale). Invoice 104, USD 1,240.00.
Birch Dental	Customer account with one Member. Invoice 208, USD 860.00.
Removed user	Dan Price, a Member of Alder Studio, removed during testing for APP-03.
Documents	One supplier statement per account, uploaded by that account's users.
Cloud and release	Repository example/platform, its deployment workflow, the roles app-runtime and ops-export-admin, and a test registry.

Where each finding sits




Figure 1. The parts of Fernleaf we reviewed. Each arrow is a point where data or permissions pass from one part to the next.

Who owns each boundary

Application engineers own the checks on records and actions. Platform engineers own background jobs and outbound traffic. Cloud and release engineers own production access and which images are promoted. The assistant's owners apply the same account rules to search, and check approval before any action runs.

How the findings combine

ARC-01, APP-01 and AI-01 are separate routes to another customer's data. CLD-01 could give a branch the deployment identity whose permissions CLD-02 covers. AI-01 can put another customer's content in front of the assistant, and AI-02 lets the assistant send data out. We did not test any of these as a chain.

How we tested and rated each finding

How we tested

We tested each rule twice, first with a request that should succeed and then with one thing changed, such as the account or the role. For each pair we recorded what we expected and what happened. Application and assistant findings come from Fernleaf's test environment, where outbound email and webhooks could not reach the internet or the internal network. Cloud and release findings come from reading policies and workflow files, and from a test registry.

Rating

Likelihood and impact are each scored from 1 to 5, and the risk score is the two multiplied. Likelihood reflects what someone needs before they can try. Impact reflects what the test showed and how sensitive the data is.

Score	Likelihood	Impact
1	Exceptional conditions	Negligible effect on operations or data
2	Several restrictive prerequisites	Limited effect on data that is not sensitive
3	A privileged foothold or an untested dependency	Material but bounded effect on data or integrity
4	An ordinary account and a simple change to a request	Another customer's confidential data, or a sensitive business change
5	Unrestricted and repeatable access	Broad privileged authority or systemic compromise

Bands: 1 to 4 Low, 5 to 11 Medium, 12 to 19 High, 20 to 25 Critical. If your environment differs from what we assumed, the score should change with it.

Evidence in this copy

Screens and logs come from the test environment, with session tokens redacted. In this public copy, steps, evidence and fixes are shown in full for APP-01 and AI-02. For the other eight findings they are supplied to the client's engineers, and each page shows a redacted thumbnail.

Findings

Ten findings in four areas, in plain words. Each finding page opens with this line and closes with what fixed looks like.

SaaS architecture

ARC-01	A customer can download another customer's invoices through the export feature.	High	09
ARC-02	A customer can set a webhook that calls services inside Fernleaf's own network.	Medium	10

Application and API

APP-01	Changing one number in an invoice link shows another customer's invoice.	High	11
APP-02	A user with read-only access can give someone full control of the customer account.	High	13
APP-03	A person removed from a customer account can still see its data while they stay signed in.	Medium	14

Cloud and CI/CD

CLD-01	A test branch can get the same production access as an approved release.	High	15
CLD-02	The release pipeline can run code under an admin role it was never meant to use.	High	16
CLD-03	The release you approve isn't guaranteed to be the one that goes live.	Medium	17

AI and agent security

AI-01	The AI search can show one customer's documents to another customer.	High	18
AI-02	The AI assistant can email a report outside the company without anyone approving it.	High	19

ARC-01 SaaS architecture

Export workers trust the account named in the request

A customer can download another customer's invoices through the export feature.

Severity	Risk	Status	Proposed owner
■ High	4 × 4 = 16	Open	Platform engineering
Affected	Export API, export queue and reporting worker		
What we found	Signed in to Alder Studio, we requested an invoice export and changed the account ID in the request to Birch Dental's. The export job kept that ID, the worker selected Birch Dental's invoices and the file was offered to the Alder Studio user. The API checks who is signed in, but the background worker trusts the account written into the job.		
Why it matters	One request can hand a customer another customer's billing records. An export holds many invoices at once, so this route leaks more than a single page view, even though the normal screens filter correctly. Likelihood 4: an ordinary member changes one field in the request. Impact 4: the export contained another customer's invoices.		

Evidence




Figure 2. The Exports page in Alder Studio's account, listing an export of another customer's invoices. Evidence supplied to the client's engineers. Redacted in this public sample.

What fixed looks like

- A customer's export contains only that customer's records.
- A request for another customer's export is refused before any job is created.
- Someone removed from an account can no longer download exports they started earlier.

Limit of the test

One export job. We did not measure how many records a full export would expose.
References: R3, listed on page 23.

ARC-02 SaaS architecture

Webhook destinations can reach the internal network

A customer can set a webhook that calls services inside Fernleaf’s own network.

Severity	Risk	Status	Proposed owner
■ Medium	3 × 3 = 9	Open	Platform and network engineering
Affected	Webhook settings and the outbound delivery service		
What we found	The webhook setting accepts any HTTPS address. It accepted ledger.internal.fernleaf.example, an internal service listed in Fernleaf’s environment inventory, and marked the endpoint active. Nothing limits webhooks to addresses on the public internet.		
Why it matters	If the server that sends webhooks can reach internal services, a customer could make it send requests to systems they cannot reach themselves. How serious that is depends on which internal services answer. Likelihood 3: any customer can set the address, but we could not confirm that the network allows the connection. Impact 3: an internal address was accepted and no data was read.		

Evidence




Figure 3. Webhook settings in Alder Studio’s account, with an internal address saved as an endpoint. Evidence supplied to the client’s engineers. Redacted in this public sample.

What fixed looks like

- ☐ Webhooks to customers’ own public addresses keep working.
- ☐ Internal, loopback and link-local addresses are refused before any connection is made.
- ☐ A redirect or a DNS change cannot move an approved webhook onto an internal address.
- ☐ The network blocks those addresses even if the application check is skipped.

Limit of the test

Checked where the address is saved. The test environment could not reach Fernleaf’s internal network, and redirects, DNS changes and firewall rules were not tested.

References: R4, listed on page 23.

APP-01 Application and API

Invoice reads skip the account ownership check

Changing one number in an invoice link shows another customer's invoice.

Severity ■ High	Risk 4 × 4 = 16	Status Open	Proposed owner Application engineering
Affected		Invoice page and GET /api/invoices/{id}	


What we found

Signed in as a Member of Alder Studio, we opened Alder Studio's invoice 104 and changed the number in the address to 208. The page showed invoice 208, which is billed to Birch Dental, with its amount and line items. The API behind the page returned the same invoice with status 200. The session was valid, but nothing checked that the invoice belongs to Alder Studio.

Why it matters

Any signed-in customer who changes the number in an invoice link can read another customer's invoice, including the customer's billing email and the amount owed.

Likelihood 4: an ordinary member changes one number in the link. Impact 4: another customer's billing record is returned, and we treat invoices as confidential between customers.




The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `app.fernleaf.example/invoices/208`. The page displays an invoice for **INV-2026-0208**, which is **Unpaid**. The invoice is billed to **Birch Dental** at 41 Quay Street, Portland, ME 04101. The invoice date is 2 September 2026, and the due date is 2 October 2026. The amount due is **USD 860.00**. The invoice includes two line items: a Growth plan for September 2026 (1 unit, 710.00) and Additional users (3 units, 150.00). The total amount is **USD 860.00**. The browser's address bar highlights the number 208 in the URL.

Figure 4. Invoice 208, billed to Birch Dental, open in Alder Studio's account. The number in the address was changed from 104.

How to reproduce and fix APP-01

Steps

- 01 Sign in as the Alder Studio member and open invoice 104, which is billed to Alder Studio.
- 02 Change 104 to 208 in the address bar. The page shows invoice 208, billed to Birch Dental (Figure 4).
- 03 Replay the page's API request for invoice 208 with the same session. The response is 200 with Birch Dental's invoice (Figure 5). The expected response is 403 or 404, with no invoice data.



```
fernleaf-test (zsh)
qa@test-01 fernleaf % ./replay.sh requests/alder-member/invoice-208.http
> GET /api/invoices/208 HTTP/2
> Host: app.fernleaf.example
> Accept: application/json
> Cookie: fl_session=
>
< HTTP/2 200
< date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 09:14:52 GMT
< content-type: application/json; charset=utf-8
< cache-control: private, no-store
< x-request-id: 01J8F3K2Q7M4W9ZV6T1N5RBX0C
<
{"id":208,"number":"INV-2026-0208","account":{"id":"acc_2b71","name":"Birch Dental"},"billing_email":"accounts@birchdental.example","status":"unpaid","issued_on":"2026-09-02","due_on":"2026-10-02","currency":"USD","total":"860.00","lines":[{"description":"Growth plan, September 2026","quantity":1,"amount":"710.00"},{"description":"Additional user s","quantity":3,"amount":"150.00"}]}
qa@test-01 fernleaf %
```

Figure 5. The API request behind the page, sent with the Alder Studio member's session. The session cookie is redacted.

Fix

- Look up each invoice by its ID and the account in the session.
- Answer unknown and foreign invoice numbers with the same 403 or 404.
- Apply the same check to cached reads, PDFs and other invoice routes.

What fixed looks like

- ☐ A member can open their own account's invoices and no one else's.
- ☐ A request for another customer's invoice returns no invoice data, from the API or from a cache.
- ☐ Unknown and foreign invoice numbers get the same response.

Limit of the test

The invoice page and its API only. ARC-01 and AI-01 cover the export and the search. We did not check whether invoice numbers can be guessed in production.

References: R1, R3, listed on page 23.

APP-02 Application and API

Members can send invitations that grant Billing admin

A user with read-only access can give someone full control of the customer account.

Severity	Risk	Status	Proposed owner
■ High	4 × 4 = 16	Open	Application and identity engineering
Affected	Users page and POST /api/account/invitations		

What we found Signed in as a Member of Alder Studio, we sent an invitation for a new user with the Billing admin role. The app accepted it, and the new user signed in as a Billing admin. Only Billing admins are meant to invite people. The account stayed the same, so this is a missing role check and separate from the cross-customer findings.

Why it matters Anyone with read-only access can give full control of the account to a second address of their own or to someone outside the business. A Billing admin can change payment details and download every invoice.

Likelihood 4: an ordinary member calls the invitation route directly. Impact 4: the invited user gained full control of the account.

Evidence




Figure 6. The Users page in Alder Studio's account, showing a Billing admin invited by a Member. Evidence supplied to the client's engineers. Redacted in this public sample.

What fixed looks like

- ☐ Only Billing admins can invite users, through the screens and through the API.
- ☐ A refused invitation creates no user and sends no email.
- ☐ Every invitation records who sent it and the role it grants.

Limit of the test One invitation with one role. Single sign-on accounts and role changes for existing users were not tested.

References: R2, R3, listed on page 23.

APP-03 Application and API

Removed users keep access until their session expires

A person removed from a customer account can still see its data while they stay signed in.

Severity	Risk	Status	Proposed owner
■ Medium	$3 \times 3 = 9$	Open	Identity and application engineering

Affected Session handling and the account overview

What we found

A Billing admin removed a user from Alder Studio. That user's open session could still load the account overview and its invoices. The app relies on the membership recorded when the session started. Fernleaf's own policy is that removal applies from the next request, and sessions last up to 60 minutes.

Why it matters

When a customer removes someone, for example a person who has left the business, that person can keep reading the account's billing information until their session ends.

Likelihood 3: it needs someone who had real access and was then removed. Impact 3: the overview stayed readable for the rest of the session.

Evidence




Figure 7. The account overview loaded by a removed user's session, ten minutes after removal. Evidence supplied to the client's engineers. Redacted in this public sample.

What fixed looks like

- ☐ The first request after someone is removed is refused.
- ☐ Removal takes effect on every server and every cache.
- ☐ People who were not removed keep their access.

Limit of the test

Requests in the first ten minutes after removal. Sign-out, token refresh and the identity provider were not tested.

References: R3, listed on page 23.

CLD-01 Cloud and CI/CD

Production role trusts every branch in the repository

A test branch can get the same production access as an approved release.

Severity	Risk	Status	Proposed owner
■ High	$3 \times 4 = 12$	Open	Cloud platform and release engineering
Affected	Trust policy of the production deployment role		
What we found	The production deployment role trusts any workflow whose subject matches repo:example/platform:*. The protected production environment matches, and so does a workflow on a feature branch. The rule keeps out other repositories, but it does not tie the role to the protected environment the release process depends on.		
Why it matters	Code from a branch that has not been through release approval could obtain production deployment permissions, unless another cloud control blocks it. Likelihood 3: it needs the ability to run a workflow in this repository. Impact 4: the role can deploy to production.		

Evidence




Figure 8. The trust policy of the production deployment role. Evidence supplied to the client's engineers. Redacted in this public sample.

- What fixed looks like**
- Only the protected production environment can assume the production role.
 - Feature branches, pull requests and other environments are refused.
 - Each production deployment records which workflow ran it.

Limit of the test We read the trust policy and compared both subjects against it. No token was requested and no role was assumed in a cloud account.
References: R5, listed on page 23.

CLD-02 Cloud and CI/CD

Deployment permissions can pass an unintended admin role

The release pipeline can run code under an admin role it was never meant to use.

Severity	Risk	Status	Proposed owner
■ High	3 × 5 = 15	Open	Cloud security and platform engineering

Affected Permissions of the deployment role

What we found The deployment role may pass any role to the functions it creates and runs. That covers the approved app-runtime role, and also ops-export-admin, which can export customer data. If ops-export-admin trusts the function service and no other policy blocks it, the pipeline can run code with that role's authority.

Why it matters Anyone who controls the release pipeline could run code with permissions well beyond deployment, including access to data exports.

Likelihood 3: it needs the deployment identity and several other conditions to hold. Impact 5: the role that could be passed can export customer data. If another policy layer blocks the path, the rating drops.

Evidence




Figure 9. The deployment role's permissions, including the pass-role statement. Evidence supplied to the client's engineers. Redacted in this public sample.

What fixed looks like

- ☐ The deployment can pass only the approved runtime roles, and only to the service it deploys to.
- ☐ An attempt to pass ops-export-admin is refused.

Limit of the test The permission statements only. Organisation policies, permission boundaries and the trust policy of ops-export-admin were not evaluated, and no function was created.

References: R6, listed on page 23.

CLD-03 Cloud and CI/CD

Release approval is not bound to the deployed image


The release you approve isn't guaranteed to be the one that goes live.

Severity	Risk	Status	Proposed owner
■ Medium	3 × 3 = 9	Open	Release engineering

Affected	Release approval and the deployment workflow
----------	--

What we found	Approval records the tag platform:stable, and the deployment pulls whatever that tag points to at the time. When we moved the tag to a different image after approval, the deployment picked up the new image and the approval record did not change. Nothing pins the image digest or checks a signature before deployment.
---------------	--

Why it matters	The software running in production can differ from what was reviewed. An accidental retag or a compromised publishing account could get past the approval step. Likelihood 3: it needs write access to the registry and the right timing. Impact 3: a different image was deployed. We did not test running harmful code.
----------------	---

Evidence	 Figure 10. The deployment workflow, showing the tag that is approved and then deployed. Evidence supplied to the client's engineers. Redacted in this public sample.
----------	--

What fixed looks like	□ Production runs the exact image that was approved. □ Moving a tag after approval does not change what is deployed. □ An image from an untrusted build is refused at release. □ Rollback goes to an earlier approved image.
-----------------------	---

Limit of the test	In the test registry and deployment workflow. Registry immutability, signing and admission policy in production were not observed. References: R7, listed on page 23.
-------------------	---

AI-01 AI and agent security

Assistant search returns other customers' documents

The AI search can show one customer's documents to another customer.

Severity	Risk	Status	Proposed owner
■ High	4 × 4 = 16	Open	AI platform and application engineering
Affected	Assistant search over uploaded documents		
What we found	Signed in to Alder Studio, we asked the assistant for last quarter's invoice totals. Its sources included a statement uploaded by Birch Dental, and the answer quoted Birch Dental's figures. Each document is labelled with its account, but the search does not filter on that label. The leak happens before the model writes its answer, so changing the prompt would not fix it.		
Why it matters	Another customer's content can reach the assistant's answer, its citations or any tool it calls. Likelihood 4: an ordinary question returned the other customer's document. Impact 4: confidential billing content crossed between customers.		

Evidence




Figure 11. An assistant answer in Alder Studio's account that cites another customer's document. Evidence supplied to the client's engineers. Redacted in this public sample.

- What fixed looks like
- ❑ Two customers asking the same question each see only their own documents.
 - ❑ Citations, caches and batch jobs follow the same rule.
 - ❑ Documents a user loses access to stop appearing in their results.

Limit of the test

Two customers with one statement each. Index partitioning and caches were not tested. References: R3, R8, listed on page 23.

AI-02 AI and agent security

The assistant can send email without the required approval

The AI assistant can email a report outside the company without anyone approving it.

Severity	Risk	Status	Proposed owner
■ High	3 × 4 = 12	Open	Agent platform and product engineering
Affected	Assistant tool actions and their approval policy		

What we found We uploaded a supplier statement with a hidden instruction asking the assistant to email Alder Studio’s invoice report to an outside address. Asked for a summary, the assistant also queued that email, and the gateway that runs its actions accepted it with no approval. Fernleaf’s policy requires a person to approve each external send.

Why it matters A document from outside the business, or a mistaken instruction, can make the assistant send account data to an outside address with no person involved.

Likelihood 3: someone must get a document or an instruction in front of the assistant. Impact 4: the action sends invoice data outside the company.





Figure 12. The assistant after summarising the statement, with the hidden instruction highlighted on the left.

How to reproduce and fix AI-02

Steps

- 01 Sign in as the Alder Studio Billing admin and open the assistant.
- 02 Upload supplier-statement-sept.pdf. Its second page carries an instruction in white text asking for the invoice report to be emailed to accounts@ledgerbox.example.
- 03 Ask the assistant to summarise the statement. It replies and queues a Send email action to that address, with no approval step (Figure 12).
- 04 The gateway log shows the action accepted with no approval attached (Figure 13). The expected result is a request for approval before anything is queued.



```

fernleaf-test (zsh)
qa@test-01 fernleaf % tail -n 5 logs/assistant-gateway.log
2026-09-18T10:42:07.118Z INFO tool.request account=acc_alder user=usr_tom_hale tool=send_email
2026-09-18T10:42:07.120Z INFO tool.policy tool=send_email external_recipient=true approval_required=true
2026-09-18T10:42:07.121Z INFO tool.admit tool=send_email approval_id=null decision=accepted
2026-09-18T10:42:07.139Z INFO outbox.queue to=accounts@ledgerbox.example attachment=invoices-jan-sep-2026.pdf
2026-09-18T10:42:07.140Z WARN outbox.send delivery disabled in this environment, message held id=msg_7731
qa@test-01 fernleaf %
  
```

Figure 13. The assistant gateway log for the same action. Delivery was switched off in the test environment.

Fix

- Queue send_email only with an approval the server can verify, tied to the user, the recipient, the report and an expiry time.
- Reject approvals that are missing, expired, reused or issued for a different recipient or report.
- Treat text from the model and from uploaded documents as untrusted input to the gateway, and log each decision.

What fixed looks like

- ☐ No report is queued or sent without a person’s approval for that recipient and that report.
- ☐ Changing the recipient or the report cancels the approval.
- ☐ An approval cannot be used twice.

Limit of the test

One document and one action type. We did not measure how often the model follows hidden instructions, and no message left the test environment.

References: R8, listed on page 23.

Five pieces of work cover the ten findings

Your engineers make these changes. Group the work by the boundary it repairs, then check each entry point on its own. Dates and staffing are for your team to set.

Work package	Findings	What changes	How you know it worked
Customer data isolation	ARC-01 APP-01 AI-01	The account is taken from the signed-in session for every request, export job and search. No field the caller controls can widen what they see.	Own-account and cross-account cases pass through the screens, the API, exports and search, including cached results.
Roles and membership	APP-02 APP-03 AI-02	Current role, current membership and a verified approval are checked before any change or external action.	Refused cases leave nothing behind. Removal and expired approvals take effect on the next request.
Production identity	CLD-01 CLD-02	Only the production workflow can assume the production role, and it can pass on only approved runtime roles.	A matrix of allowed and refused subjects and roles, checked with every policy layer in place.
Webhook destinations	ARC-02	An application rule for allowed destinations, backed by network egress controls.	Internal, redirected and re-resolved addresses fail from the real delivery network.
Release images	CLD-03	Approval and deployment both use the same verified image digest.	The deployed digest matches the approved one, and an unapproved image is refused.

While fixes are prepared

Switch off or narrow an affected feature where the check cannot be added straight away. For example, turn off exports until ARC-01 is fixed, and keep the assistant's send action disconnected until AI-02 is fixed. Hiding a button is not enough, so test that the route itself is closed.

If a fix is deferred

Record what stays exposed, the compensating control, who accepted the risk, when that acceptance expires and what would trigger a review. A compensating control nobody has tested does not close a finding.

What we need to see before a finding closes

Stage	Record	Accepted when
Triage	Owner, affected release, agreed severity and scope.	The evidence supports the finding and its impact.
Fix	Change reference, the design or policy change, and every entry point it covers.	Each affected entry point has a named place where the check happens.
Verification	Refused and permitted cases run against the fixed build.	The refused action fails with no side effects, and normal use still works.
Retest (optional)	Request and result record, environment and build reference.	A reviewer can repeat the original case and see it refused.
Residual risk	Anything left untested, accepted limits and the decision record.	Nothing unresolved is reported as fixed.
Checks for every finding	– Run the same account and role checks on direct API calls, background jobs, cached reads and assistant actions. – Change authority between a request and its execution, for example by removing a user, and confirm the change is honoured. – Confirm that refused requests leave no queued work, files, messages or data behind. – Where permissions are cached, repeat the checks on more than one server.	
Retest	Not part of this report. Your engineers make the fixes. Retesting is optional and quoted separately.	
Handover	For each finding, supply the finding ID, the build or policy version, the results of the refused and permitted cases, log references and anything left untested. Keep credentials and confidential data out of tickets.	

Limits and references

This report	Fernleaf Billing, its customers, people and data are fictional. No real client was assessed.
Coverage	These ten findings come from the paths we tested. Other defects may exist, including Critical ones. Each finding page states the limit of its own test.
Not tested	We did not test sign-in and token handling, live cloud accounts, production traffic, message delivery, denial of service or social engineering.
References	R1 <u>OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023): API1, Broken Object Level Authorization</u> Checks on each record a user asks for. APP-01. R2 <u>OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023): API5, Broken Function Level Authorization</u> Role checks on each action. APP-02. R3 <u>OWASP Authorization Cheat Sheet</u> Least privilege and checks on every request. ARC-01, APP-01 to APP-03, AI-01. R4 <u>OWASP Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention Cheat Sheet</u> Destination checks and network controls. ARC-02. R5 <u>AWS IAM: Create a role for OpenID Connect federation</u> Subject conditions in workflow trust policies. CLD-01. R6 <u>AWS IAM: Grant permissions to pass a role to an AWS service</u> Limiting which roles can be passed, and to which service. CLD-02. R7 <u>SLSA v1.2: Verifying artifacts</u> Image identity, provenance and trust policy. CLD-03. R8 <u>OWASP LLM Prompt Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet</u> Untrusted inputs, least-privilege tools and human approval. AI-01, AI-02.
Terms	Account: one customer of Fernleaf, with its own users and invoices. Boundary: the point where identity, data or authority must be checked. Closure: a recorded decision, made after the fix is verified, that the finding is resolved. Sources checked 23 September 2026.



Unmesha Technologies

contact@unmesha.io

www.unmesha.io

UM-SA-001 · Revision 3.0 · 1 October 2026